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Summary findings
Commander,  Kollo,  and Ugaz  describe  the main changes  burden, while setting  tax rates  that enhance  the growth
in the Hungarian labor marke:  since  1989. They focus  of labor. The type of growth seen  in the last four years  is
specially  on changes  in behavior  in state and privatized  probably  not sustainable.
firms,  since  the shedding  and restructuring  of labor are at  Withi  tax evasion  high, average  payro!l  taxes  in the
the heart of the transition.  They  describe  five  types of  taxablc  sector have  until recently  risen  sharply. Social
firms:  insurance  spending  and other !abor  taxes represented
* State firms (often in bad shape  and/or natural  about 34 percent of hourly  compensation  costs  in 1992
monopolies).  - significantly  more proportionately  than in OECD  and
* New or privatized  firms  with significant  foreign  most transition  economies.  And high contribution  rates
direct  investment,  together  with apparent real  wage rigidity  have  depressed
* Firms  privatized  by insiders.  the rate of job creation in the taxed sectors.
* Firms  privatized  by outside (but  domestic)  investors.  Wage  levels  are lower  than in ncighboring  countries
* New small-scale  ("de novo") private  firms.  but higher than in other transition  economies.  Despite
The state and de novo firms are increasingly  outside  adverse  shocks  to oLtput and employment,  consumption
the tax system  - the srte  firms  by de facto tax  wages  have  risen slightly  and unit labor  costs have  clearly
exemptions,  the de novo firms  through tax evasion.  As  increased.
the de novo sector grows,  the effective  tax yield will rend  Commander,  Kollo,  and Ugaz  emphasize  the
to faill,  shifting  the tax burden to the other three types of  continuing  loss  of employment  and its changing
firms.  distribution  in terms of ownership,  sector,  and taxation
Subsidizing  the growth of the private  sector may  have  - as well  as associated  changes  in unemployment  that
been  desirable  initially,  but it is dynamically  undesirable.  have  resulted  from the asmmetric paths of the state and
It is important to change  the distribution  of the tax  prvate sectors.
This  paper-  a product  of the  National  Economic  Management  Division,  Economic  Development  Institute-  is part of  a larger
effort  to analyze  the behavior  of labor  markets  in the transition.  The study  was  funded  by the Bank's  Research  Support  Budget
under  the research  project  "Labor  Markets  in  Transitional  Socialist  Economies"  (RPO  677-30).  Copies  of  this  paper  are  available
free  from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Plcase  contact  Barbry  Keller,  room  M3-047,  extension
35195  (43  pages).  October  1994.
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This paper is an attempt to lay out the main changes in the Hungarian labor market
since 1989.  Our coverage includes a discussion of the firm sector, with particular attention
paid to the behavior of state and privatized firms.  Their behavior is clearly at the heart of
transition, given the importance  of labor shedding and restructuring. Throughout  we emphasize
a  central feature  of  the  transition; the  continuing loss of  employment and  its changing
distribution in terms of ownership, sector and taxation, as well as the associated evolution of
unemployment that has resulted from the asymmetric paths of state and private sectors.
Employment changes
Hungarian fins  relative to other Eastern European comparators  cut employment -- often
by involuntary means - early in the transition and in large magnitudes. Figure 1 indicates that
a decline in employment of over 33% since 1989 with an even larger decline in the firm sector.
This  appears to  have continued through 1993.  Between 1992.4 and  1993.4 employment
declined by over 230,000, with over 100,000  accounted for by industry, so that between 1990
and 1994 the domestic economy has lost over 900,000 jobs.  Most of these job  losses have
been in the state sector. For the period 1990-1993,  the ratio of state sector job losses to private
sector job gains was 1.7; but this likely underestimates  the growth in self employment
Relating the change in unemployment  to the negative of the change in employment over
the period January 1990 to January 1993 gives us a ratio of 0.6.  If this ratio had been unity,
the decline in employment would have translated completely into unemployment. That it has
not suggests quite powerful out of the labor force effects and these are likely to increase as
tighter eligibility rules for unemployment benefits work through
A further feature of the changes in employment has been the very rapid growth in the
number of firms operating in the domestic economy, as Table 1 indicates these multiplied by
over six times between end-1989 and end-1993.  The proliferation in firms - and a sharp
increase in  firm turnover rates -- has also been accompanied by a powerful reduction in
average firm size; a reduction that has occurred across sectors.  By 1993 nearly 50% of legal
entities employed eleven or fewer workers.  In sum, average firm size in terms of employment
has changed radically, as the large integrated units characteristic of the socialist period have
either been closed or split up.
The decline in employment has clearly driven by shocks to output; since 1989 theseTable 1:  Number of legal entities and employment  size characteristics;
1989-1993 (end-period) as shares
-- No. of employees--  --
Year  1-20  21-50  51-300  >300  Number
1989  38  18  25  19  13568
1990  59  15  16  1O  27662
1991  72  12  11  5  50746
1992  78  10  9  3  67505
1993  82  9  7  2  83535
Source: Statisztikai Havi Kozlemenyek
Table 2: Employment  equation
Employment (end93/end92)
T stat
dW93  -0.71  -2.3
dREVS93  0.77  12.0
Investment  8.37  6.6
Bankruptcy  -37.7  -12.8
Bad Debt  -6.9  -5.4
Constant  100.3  3.4
F  141.9
1(2  .23
Sample: LMFS (without agriculture, budgetary sphere and fims  being privatized (1#3235)
dW93=Average  wage end93/end92;  dREVS93=  Revenues  93.4/92.4;  Investment New installed
capacity; Bankruptcy= process under way June 93 -June 94; Bad Debt =  Firm's bad debt
Table 3:  Characteristics  of 'strategic  finms', 1989-1993
(1993 constant  prices: HUF bn)
Profit
Year  Net Sales  Exports  before tax  Assets  Equity  Employm.
1989  578007  232273  41759  383275  239727  103422
1993  230977  108037  (-8547)  256560  136012  58111
Source: Ministry of Finance
3Figure  1
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4have indeed been large and the channels  diverse. By early 1994 industrial sector output was
at least 25% down over end-1989 levels, though with some signs of recovery in 1993.  The
fall in output was initially fairly common across sectors; only later do we pick up greater
variation in changes across branches.
However, it  is as well to think of  Hungarian firms entering transition with very
significant labor hoarding. This implied  that major changes  to the level of employment  were
required to  bring employment closer to competitive levels. Figures 2-7 provide scatters of
output on employment changes for each year from 1989. Because these look at variations
rather than levels, it is of course only one measure of the dynamic adjustment;  proportional
change could still be consistent with an employment bias.  They are based on CSO data
disaggregated  to the 3 digit level and cover 68 branches of industry. The scatters are further
disaggregated  in terms of branch exposure to ruble or CMEA trade in 1989.  Clearly, given
what we know about the size of the CMIEA  shock to Hungary ', we would expect the shock
to output to have been larger for CMEA-exposed  firms. This is indeed the case. By 1992 the
bulk of CMEA-exposed  branches  registered  output declines  in the region of 40-60%;  branches
with lower CMEA exposure had generally experienced declines of  30-40%. Employment
declines  were also of similarly  higher  magnitudes  in CMEA-exposed  branches. And this seems
to hold through 1993 as well 3.
The adjustment  of employment  in the face of these  output losses  has several dimensions.
First, it is clear that both CMRA-exposed  and other branches adjuse  employment  rapidly and
almost equivalently  to the output change  in 1990. Most changes are close to a 45 degree line
for 1990. For 1991 and 1992  the story is somewhat  different.  For both sets, most observations
shift to the left of the 45 degree line, indicating  ar. elasticity  of employment  to output changes
significantly  below unity. The number  of observations  and the distance leftwards  from the 45
degree line are larger in the case of CMEA-exposed  branches.
Official data indicate that employment  in industry  was down c7.5% in 1993 which,
See Commander  and Conielli  (1993).
3 Due  to reclassification  of  branhes  and hngcs in size  coverage  by  the  Central  Statistical  Office,  the  1993
data  are  not  strictly  comparable  with  the  earlier  periods.
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Is~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Igiven the small output recovery, led to a  10/11%  improvement in productivity. Variation in
employment changes over branches increased  in 1993  and there has continued to be large intra-
branch variation. This can probably be interpreted as a  measure of reallocation shocks, as
structural shocks come finally to dominate aggregate effects.
Since  1993 with  increasing title transformation, more recent job  losses have been
concentrated  not only in the remaining state sector but also in privatized firms, though the bulk
of  layoffs in  the latter appear to  precede privatization.  The latter outcome in  part arises
because privatization agreements normally include employment; hence making it difficult to
fire after title change.
Despite the  fact that  the  labor demand estimation reported in  Table 2  has  quite
conventional properties, including wages negatively signed and significant; revenues and/or
sales positively signed and significant  4,  it is nevertheless clear that there are a major bloc of
firms -- both state and private -- that continue to hoard  labor and use this as a major bargaining
chip with govermment  and the banking system.
This is confinned for 1992 where a crude estimate of the total number of employees
retained in  chronic loss making units is of the order of  170,000 5.  These loss makers --
principally the  41  huge  loss  makers  --  likely  face  continuing and  major  employment
restructuring but at present continue to attract 'soft' financing partly because -- in employment
terms - they are seen as too large to fail.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that major loss-makers have already initiated large
scale employment adjustments.  One measure of this is that those firms now classed by the
governent  as strategic, reduced employment by nearly 50% between 1989 and  1993, as
indicated in Table 3.  This suggests two things.  First, labor shedding has already occurred;
restructuring now implies going beyond this.  Second, the reluctance to enforce closure can
partly be linked to monopsony in local labor markets.  Excluding MAV (Railways), it looks
as if roughly half of current employment is in firms that are in spatial terms equivalent to
4 Whether using CSO 3 digit data (as in Commander,  Kollo, Ugaz and Vilagi 1994)  or the Forecast Survey,
as in Table 2.
S These numbers  and the discussion  that follows  are based on balance sheet  information.
7monopsonists.
We do not know the 1993 picture yet, but for 1992 large loss-making firms accoumted
for around 8% of employment in the enterprise sector (as measured by those submitting tax
returns)  and  total  loss-mnakers  for  nearly  40%  of  employment (or  c22%  of  aggregate
employment). These numbers are large. But 'exit' rules, as we indicate in more detail below,
are still protracted and there appears to be a major bottleneck in the courts' ability to handle
bankruptcies.  The average lag between filing and conclusion of legal process appears to be
in excess of two years.
What accounts for the losses ?  There are several possibilities; the first is a possible
negative relative price shock-cum-technological  shock. Further, many of the major loss-makers
appear to  have very  high prior exposure to  CMlEA markets; this  appears to  hold  for a
significant proportion of the strategic companies, indicated in Table 3, where export revenues
averaged over 40% of total sales in 1989. The second can be attributed to the high cost of
borrowing facing firms.  There appears  to be little long term credit made available to firms by
banks while short term borrowing is at real interest rates currently between 15-20%,  deflating
by producer prices.  These problems are magnified  of course in cases where fimns entered the
transition under-capitalized. Viable fiuns appear to have started borrowing abroad.
The firm sector, losses and financing
What follows is largely based on the 1992 balance sheet data, whose quality remains
suspect.  Nevertheless, aggregate numbers appear to be meaningful.  What is more complex
concerns the apparent separation  of legal entities  from productive  units. Given that the dataset
is primarily a tax record, this reflects the dissociation  of assets and liabilities and is part of the
shell game that significant numbers of firms play with the tax authorities and with the banking
system.  As such, the phenomenon can be seen as part of the broader question of the erosion
of the tax base.  The employment  implications are rather more opaque.
For 1992 we find that nearly 50% of firms filing tax returns registered losses in excess
of 0.1 billion forints; the sum of those losses accounted for 13% of GDP (HUF380 billion).
The distributions are very similar for state firms and private ones; 50% make losses; roughly
50°/0  of their respective employments  are in loss makers. Losses swamp the profitable entities.
In short, at first inspection  there seems to be litde that-  separates  out state from privatized firms.
8However,  96% of loss makers  lost under 0.05 billion  forints  and they accounted  for 23% of
total losses and 49% of loss-makers'  employment. So clearly there is a tight association
between  loss making  and firn size. A significant  proportion  (>75%)  remain  on the books  of
either  the State Privatization  Agency  (AVU)  or State Holding  Company  (AVRt).
The collapse  in profits  characterizes  not only ownership  types but also sectors. After
tax profits of legal entities  " outside  of agriculture  shifted  from 190 billion HUF in 1990  to
losses  of near 300 billion  HUF in 1992  or roughly  9/10%  of respective  GDPs. There has  been
a clear reduction  in the average  profit rate as well as contraction  in the distribution  of profits,
particularly  in the upper tail of the distribution. The collapse in profits characterizes  all
sectors.
How were these  losses  financed  ?  Looking  at the structure  of debt,  we find that short
term  liabilities  dominate  massively  (82%)  for the total  sample  of loss-makers  but note that only
32% of  liabilities were bank debt.  These shares are reasonably  stable across debt-size
categories. Around  a quarter  of total liabilities  are attributable  to government;  equivalent  to
aver 10% of GDP in 1992. Assuming  that all liabilities  to government  of the worst loss-
makers were write-offs;  this amounted  to around 3.5% of GDP. In sum, the size of the
attributed  losses  to government  were  roughly  equivalent  to half the fiscal  deficit  in 1992.  Thus,
even as explicit  subsidies  to the firm sector  have declined  -- from 3.2% of GDP in 1990  to
0.6/0.7% in 1993 and 1994 -- the  real exposure of the government to the firm sector has been
quite different and much larger. At this point, we need consider in some more detail the
implications  of financial  losses  in the firm sector.
Exits: bankruptcy and liquidation
Procedures  for the exit of firms and their enforcement  are obviously  key to inducing
any shift to hard budget constraints. Without  a credible  threat, it is unlikely  that the regime
of soft budget constraints  can be broken. The Bankruptcy  Law that came into operation  in
January  1992  (and subsequent  .changes  in late 1993)  provides  a coherent  framework  and was
associated  with a rapid filing of cases, either for bankruptcy  -- here implying  restructuring
and/or  privatization  - as well as liquidation  or closure.
'At  end 1992  these  comprised  over  57,000  units  employing  over  2.2 million  people.
9Table  4 gives  a breakdown  for both bankruptcies  and liquidations  since 1992. Several
features  stand  out. It appears  that roughly  7/S%  of legal entities  have  passed  into bankruptcy
or liquidation  in !992/93. However,  the rate of bankruptcy  filings  has decelerated  sharply
since 1992  and liquidation  filings  have  also decreased.  There  is a significant  lag between  the
time of filing and actual disposal of the case.  For the period 1992-1994.2  only 27% of
bankruptcy cases were administratively  closed and just over 10% of  liquidations  were
completed.  In both processes,  in-court  or out-of-court  settlements  have been  quite important.
The average  time for court proceedings  appears  to be aroumd  two years with a further two
years  for conclusion  of any liquidation  process.
Despite  this significant  lag, the employment  implications  are likely  to be quite major.
In 1992  nearly 8% of employees -- or 172,000 people -- in firms submitting balance sheets
were in bankruptcy  and, of those, 131,000  were in firms that had filed and completed  the
bankruptcy  process  by mid-1993. This crudely  suggests  that the direct  employment  effect of
bankruptcy  or restructuring  has not been  that large. The implications  are likely  to be far more
serious  in the case of liquidations,  where over 400,000  employees  were involved  in 1992.
Most of this employment  (for both bankruptcies  and liquidations)  has been concentrated  in
manufacturing  and agriculture  '. However,  because  of lags  in filing  and disposal  of cases, only
47,000  jobs had been directly  affected  by mid 1993  so that the adverse  employment  effects
have still largely  to pass through.
Figures 8-10 provide some corroborative  evidence on the  relationship between
bankruptcy  or liquidation  status and staff reductions. The scatters  indicate  quite clearly  that
almost all firms in the LMFS population  actually  had separations  in 1992 and 1993.  In
addition,  these  staff  reductions  were more  or less proportionate  to firm size. But for 1992  with
'77  % of employment  for bankruptcy  cases and 61% for liquidations.
10Table  4: Bankruptcies  and  Liquidations:  199241994.2
1992  1993  1994.1-2  Cumulative
Bankruptcies
Total  4169  987  40  5196
of which;
self-filed (%)  25%  14%  57%  23%
mandatory  (%)  75%  86%  43%  77%
Court announced  66%
No proceedings  41%
Settled out-of-court  25%
Admijiistratively closed  27%
Liquidations
Filed at court  9891  7242  917  18050
by creditors (%)  82%  81%  -50%  80%
by debtors  (%)  18%  19%  50%  20%
Court announced  29%
Administratively closed  50%
Completed  10%
Source: Ministry of Finance
Table 5: Firms  in bankruptcylliquidation  (loss-makers  over 0.1 bnHUF): 1992
Type  Number  In Bankruptcy/Liquidation  Share
Value  113  60  53%
Subtractors
Near Value  242  140  58%
Subtractors
Negative  189  83  440/o
operating
profit
Source: Ministry of Finance and World Bank
11Figure  8
Staff reduction by firm size 1992
firms  under  bankruptcy  procedure  (.)
other  firms  (.)
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12Figure  9
Staff  reduction by firm  size 1993
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13Figure  10
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14the first wave of bankruptcies, finms under this process evidently had higher separations than
those outside.  This no longer seems to hold for 1993; firms under bankruptcy procedure did
not separate more than others.
What about the exit of the larger loss-makers ?  For this category (firms  with losses
>0.1 bnHUF) 292 out of the 603 were in bankruptcy or liquidation but only 5 out of the 41
largest loss-makers.  In other words, the bulk of bankruptcies/liquidations were concentrated
among relatively small loss-makers.
We can go a bit firther  with this and disaggregate in terms of (i) value subtractors
(where sales < material costs), (ii) near value subtractors (sales < material + labor costs) and
(iii) firms in which sales were greater than material and labor costs combined. Table 5 shows
that at mid-1993, 355 firms in category (i) or (ii) firms were in bankruptcy or liquidation and
this accounted for firms making around 50% of total 1992 losses for loss-makers with >HUF
0.1 bn losses.
Using these categories, we can also derive a  crude employment decision rule.  All
employment in value subtracting firms represents an outright loss to society; we assume that
this is also pretty much true for category (ii).  This sums to 144,000 workers in 1992 or 6.5%
of the firm sector.  Very crudely (and, probably inappropriately, assuming that none of these
jobs  could be  saved (but  ignoring downstream losses) an  instantaneous pass-through into
unemployment would have jumped the unemployment rate by over 20% at end-1992.  As it
is, by mid-1993 Table 7 shows that roughly 55% of category (i) and (ii) firms were in either
bankruptcy or liquidation procedure.  In employment terms, this translates into approximately
73,000 workers; an implicit jump to the unemployment rate of between 10/11%. Continuing
our crude line of thinking, we still have an 'employment overhang' from categories (i) and (ii)
of c70,000 employees 8
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn at this stage.  In the first place, despite a
broadly adequate legal framework, there are large lags in enforcement and these are unlikely
to be reduced in the short term  Second, the bankruptcy and liquidation data confirm the
impression  -- indicated  earlier  - of  quite significant turnover  of  finrms,  as well  as of jobs.  In
sThis is all very crude,  as we ignore  any effects  via restructuring.
15Table 6: Employment  Profile  of Loss-makers:  1992
----- Size  of Loss------
>1 bn HUF  0.1-1 bn HUF  Combined
Majority State
Firms
Number  25  281  306
Employment (000s) 149  172  321
Av. Employment  5960  612  1049
Other
Number  16  281  297
Employment (000s) 21  91  112
Av. Employment  I313  324  377
Total
Number  41  562  603
Employment (000s) 170  263  433
Av. Employment  4146  468  718
Source: Ministry of Finance and World Bank
Table  7: Types  of Loss-makers,  Employment  and Bankruptcy/Liquidation
Total  Total  No. in
Category  Number  Employment  Bankrp/Liqdt  Employment
(i)  113  16,400  60  10,100
(ii)  242  127,800  140  62,900
(iii)  189  .107,500  83  51,200
(iv)  58  81,000  9  11,500
[Note: (iv) includes firms that were profitable before deducting interest or depreciation]
Source: Ministry of Finance and World Bank
16any recent year around 8% of firms have been either restructuring under bankruptcy or else
being closed down.  The available evidence suggests that much of this action is concentrated
among smaller firms; at least half the larger loss-making enterprises had managed by mid-1993
to avoid any form of procedure and this was particularly true for the largest loss-makers.
There is clear asymmetry in the implementation  of the bankruptcy/liquidation  rules. Third, there
is some evidence that liquidation proceedings are quite commonly initiated from within the
firm.  While Table 4 has shown creditor filing dominating in the case of liquidations, a sample
of firms taken by the Ministry of Finance in 1993 found that in over 40% of cases, self-filing
had initiated the process with 15% initiated by suppliers and a further 20% by either the tax
or social security office.  Commercial banks were the filing agency in under 10% of cases,
suggesting some passivity on their part. It is yet unclear whether the dominance of manager
initiated liquidation carries implications for the balance over closure or restructuring. Finally,
restructuring decisions  that  go  beyond labor  shedding, and  can  be  associated  with  the
bankruptcy procedure, have to face high financing costs --  exacerbated by the large wedge
between  consumer and producer  prices  --  and  uncertainty.
The new private  sector
The above is the gloomier side of the canvas; looking at private sector job creation has
brighter spots.  De novo private finns now likely account for around 30% of total employment
and by 1992 self-employed, partnerships and fully private firms accounted for nearly 75% of
private emiployment. Most of these firms are stock-adjusters in trade and services and there
is high turnover.  The stock adjustment is probably largely complete (services account for 55-
60% of  employment) and this may explain relative employment losses in trade and services
emerging in  1993.  We should probably not expect too much more deepening, save perhaps
at the top end with the financial sector.  The gap fillers are largely self or curb financed with
small exposure to the banking system.  The size of their operations may not - at least in the
medium term - make credit rationing from the banldng system too negative.
From  the  govemment  perspective,  this  type  of  private  sector  growth  is  fiscally
damaging, as most firms avoid any tax obligations, leaving indirect tax revenues as the only
draw-off by the fisc.  In sum, since transition started in earnest the growth of the private sector
has been accelerated by its tax advantages; in effect private sector growth being subsidized by
17state and other fmns  in the taxed economy or put differeptly, non-tradables subsidized by
tradables producers.  Future growth will likely need a more diversified and taxable base.
Wages and labor costs
Clearly the level of employment will be sensitive not only to firm decisions on labor
shedding, and hence to the underlying institutional and other constraints, but also the choice
over wages and employment picked by managers and workers.  This section takes a look at
the wage path and setting.
Real consumption wages in industry declined by fairly small magnitudes  -in 1990, 1991
and 1992, but rose in 1993 (Fig. II).  At end 1993, they were down about 4% over 1989. But
given the large wedge between consumer and producer price changes in all years (fig.  12)9,
which has only been part  offset by  the  fall in consumption wages and  increase in labor
productivity, we observe significant increases in unit labor costs. The latter rose 7% in 1990,
8% in  1991, 1% in  1992 and 4% in 1993; a cumulative rise of over 20% since 1989.  What
is not obvious is that wage pressure, associated with aggressive wage bargaining.by workers
and unions, is driving a cost squeeze.  Rather, as we indicate below, the bargaining structure
itself may over-determine the wage decision and converge both average wage settlements in
the economy as well as wages to prices.
A more inclusive measure of the evolution of real compensation costs (incorporating
non-wage labor costs as well as wages) indicates a 10% increase in forint terms for industry
between 1989-1992 when deflating by producer prices.  Using consumer prices gives a 6%
decline over the same period.  Most of the increase is loaded into 1992 and is likely to have
been magnified in 1993. Factoring in the exchange rate, Godfrey (1993) shows that the US$
labor cost per unit of output in manufacturing rose by 27% over the same perod,  but much of
this is accounted for by the increase in non-wage costs, rather than by wages.  As such, we
find that non-wage labor costs comprised nearly 45% of total  labor costs in  1992.  Social
insurance and unemployment fund contributions alone account for nearly 30% of total labor
costs.  Employers thus pay contributions,  of over 50% to these funds; up from 40% in 1986.
Using current exchange rates, this implied that hourly dollar compensation costs in Hungary
'The wedge  is projected  to be around  516%  in 1994.
18Figures  11-12
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19in 1992 were between 40-80% higher than in Poland and the Czech Republic.
The effective marginal tax rate on labor income (at >70%) is high both with respect to
other transition economies and to Western European comparators I.  Similarly, the effective
tax rate on capital income is near the top of the distribution (>80%). The disincentive effects
are two fold; affecting labor supply and investment as well as the propensity for tax evasion.
In  the present  context, we  can  think of  the  work disincentive primarily in  terms  of the
diversion of effort from the taxed part of the economy to the non-taxed component. We return
to this below.
At  a more disaggregated level, how have wages behaved ?  Until 1992, we observe
surprisingly little dispersion in wage changes across branches.  But in both 1992 and 1993 it
seems that beneath this, there is larger intra-branch wage dispersion.  Figures  13-18 give
scatters relating the change in wages, deflated by consumer  prices, to the change in sales since
1989 at the 3 digit level.  Again, a distinction is made over branches with and without sizeable
export exposure in  1989 to  CMAEA  markets. The scatters are quite clear in showing some
heterogeneity; branches with high CMEA exposure exhibit a fairly consistent disjuncture in
changes to  sales and real wages through 1992. And information for  1993 -- which is not
strictly comparable -- indicates that this continued into that year.  Thus, despite large declines
in real sales, wages exhibit surprising real stability and no apparently robust association with
changes to sales.  The picture that thus emerges is one in which wages appear to be governed
by factors exogenous to the branch and branch sales.  Branches with above average increases
to real sales do not appear to transmit these to wages; inversely, larger than average declines
in sales have no significant on wages.
We  now explore in  some detail wage changes in  1993, using more disaggregated
information from the Labor Market Forecast Survey.  Table 8 reports our wage estimation.
It shows that firm wages were positively and significantly related to sales, investment and bad
debts to the firm, as well as to size.  Wages were negatively associated with bankruptcy.  In
terms of firm size, it looks as if small firms have a normal distribution and a reasonably tight
wage-revenues association.  By contrast, large fims  (with >2000 employees) have very
'See  EBRD (1993) for the calculations  of marginal rates on labor and capital income.
20Figures  13-18
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MO  t~~~D  *  0  *  0~2Table 8: Wage equation [LMFS N=38871
Dependent  variable:  dW93 (average wage end 1993/end 1992)
Variable  B  T  BE  T
dRevenues  .1367  10.8  .1376  10.9
Bankruptcy  4.4983  -5.5  -4.51  -5.5
Bad debt  .7779  2.1  .8044  2.2
Investment  1.6115  4.6  1.6242  4.7
dU  .0095  -2.8
U (93.1)  .0438  2.1
Size 500+  2.2516  4.8  2.3114  4.9
Size <50  -3.1939  -9.2  -3.2381  -9.3
(Constant)  99.2246  70.8  97.3369  70.8
aR2  .1223  .1212
F  60.67  60.03
Variables: dRevenues= revenues end 1993/end 1992; Bankruptcy= in process June-December
1993; Investment-  new capacity installed; Bad Debt= debt to other firms; U level= January
1993, rates for 176  regions; dU= change in unemployment, September 1993/January 1993; Size a10  - 5  nf%l ---- I  ;  Oi  'Cf  ia  t  Cf ornnlnnnoc.
-)  Ju  ciuVpiuyc  ,  'JA  ~-ov-  At'O  t"m  .. n.a
Source:  HEill
Table  9: Average wage and bonus  change in 1992 by size and financial  status
---  Wage--  ----  Bonuses--
Size  Wage  cv  Profit  Loss  Profit  Loss
<10  18.2  .55  23.5  12.3  22.2  9.9
11-20  19.4  .37  15.8  23.6  12.0  10.5
21-50  20.3  .33  20.7  19.6  13.1  8.6
51-200  22.7  .22  22.8  22.7  7.0  4.6
201-300  20.5  .15  25.8  17.8  4.0  4.6
>300  18.2  .15  22.2  14.7  3.6  4.0
All firms  21.8  18.3  13.5  6.9
Source:  Ministry  of Finance and  World  Bank
22convergent wage changes and far weaker correlation with revenues ".  This distinction may
explain the lack of association, using 3 digit level data, between wages and sales that we report
above. The two specifications reported below also indicate little or no feedback to wages from
unemployment, An increase in the rate of unemployment has a negative impact on the change
in the wage (dW) while a high rate has no or a slight positive effect.
To what extent are wage settlements government by firm-specific financial conditions
or  ability to  pay ?  Here, it is useful to  distinguish between changes to  wages and wage
inclusive of bonuses.  The.latter are generally paid in the last two months of any year and are
reasonably sizable; for 1993 nominal industrial wages at end-year  jumped over 25% as a result
of bonus payments.  The wage-revenue association  pinned down in the wage equation reported
in Table 8 using the LMFS dataset is confirmed by the Ministry of Finance dataset.  Table 9
provides information on both the average wage increase and bonuses in 1992 in terms of both
firm size and profit or loss-making status.  The conclusions are evident. The change in wages
does not  vary very  much by  firm size but the  variation increases dramatically in  inverse
association to size. (Wage levels are also far more dispersed among small firms.)  Further,
while for most size classes the change in wages in  1992 disaggregated over profit and loss
makers suggests that the latter sanctioned lower wage increases, the gap is not that large.  In
short, using this dataset, it does not appear that small firms tie wages that much more closely
to revenues. But introducing bonuses tells a somewhat different story. The latter are far larger
among small firms and are clearly and positively correlated with firm profitability, particularly
among smaller firms.  This  can probably be related to  the presence of  co-ownership or
partnerships among the smaller units.
The presence of partnerships among the small firms may explain the fact that labor
costs tend if anything to  be higher in this group.  As Table 10 shows, part of this can be
attributed to the effect of bonus payments but it holds true when excluding bonuses.  This is
not inconsistent with the fact of higher wage increases in 1993 in large firms, as indicated by
"Note  that in the MoF dataset, for the largest loss makers in 1992,  wages as a share of total costs were around
33% (the share is highest for large SOE loss-makers); as against 16-19% for other loss-making categories and
11/12% wage shares in the economy as a whole.  This smacks of decapitalization.
23Table  10: Labor  Cost by firm size, ownership and components (OOOHUF  per worker  per
month):  1992
-_Components---  -------- Ownership-
labor  fully  part
Firm  size  wage  taxes  bonus  cnst  priv  priv  state
<10  32.4  13.4  18.1  63.9  53.7  64.5  112.3
11-20  29.3  12.7  11.6  53.6  48.0  60.0  59.2
21-50  29.3  12.6  11.3  53.2  47.7  64.9  51.0
51-200  19.4  8.7  5.6  33.7  33.8  38.3  31.7
201-300  16.6  7.5  4.1  28.2  28.2  26.6  28.7
>300  18.9  8.6  3.9  31.4  30.2  31.3  3i.7
Source: Ministry of Finance
Table  11: Wage and  employment  changes for value subtracting  and other  firms,  1992
--- Firms  with:-  ---- Firms  with--
Other  Sales<Material  Costs  Other  Sales<Wages
Employment  89.3  42.1  87.6  52.9
change (dL92)
Wage change  119.4  133.0  122.7  172.4
(dw92)
Bonuses (000  9.9  13.5  9.9  14.2
HUF per month)
[Note: finns with sales<material costs comprise 9.4% of the sample; firms with sales<wages
6.5%]
Source: Ministry of Finance and World Bank
24the LMFS nor with roughly equal wages in the private and state sectors  12*  The very high
labor costs among small state firms may possibly be explained by the use of shell entities,
already alluded to above.
Ability to pay is clearly important,  at least in governing the bonus component of wage
income. However, given the size and distribution  of loss-makers,  what evidence, if any, exists
for predatory wage setting ?  Value subtracting firms are not only numerous (c.6000 in 1992)
but -- see Table 11  -- also appear to experience above average wage and bonus increases. The
reductions in employment are large for both categories of value subtractors -- between 47-58%
declines for 1992 over 1991, but very striking, is the large margin in wage increases over other
better-performing fims.  For finns with sales below wage costs, nominal wages increased by
over 70% on average as against around 20% for other firms.  Further, bonuses relative to
wages are high.  For finms  with sales below wages, the average wage bill was rou  ghly equal
-to sales, while bonuses were about 80% of both variables 13  Appendix 1 concentrates on
wage and employment decisions  in firms held by the AVRt and further indicates the very weak
or absent association of wage changes to measures of financial performance.
On  relative  skill wages, the picture  is of  a  decompression of the  inherited wage
arrangement. At an economy-wide  level, for exaample,  white collar wages grew by 31% while
blue collar wages only grew by 23% in  1992. And the earnings functions reported below
(Table 12) using the Hungarian Household Panel yield not only a conventional set of returns
to education but also a clear increase in returns to education for 1993 over 1992. The result
is robust and statistically significant across wages, earnings and income measures and points
to non-trivial changes to relativities and the likely growing inequality in the wage and income
distribution. It is striking that the coefficients on the education variables are both larger and
more significant than either sector or ownership variables.
With respect to relative branch wages, 2 digit industry level data show smnall  variation
in wage changes in 1993 (but this may, as noted above, camouflage quite large intra-branch
variation).  The stability of relative branch wages cannot be laid at the door of an incomes
'  As reported  in Commander  et al (1994).
u Part  of this may  be severance  payments  to workers  but this cam  account  for the  geneal pattern.
25Table 12: Earnings functions: IM  & 1993
Wage in 1992  Wage in 1993
Variable  T stat  T stat
Female  -.31  -14.8  -.25  -11.5
Age  .04  8.3  .04  6A
Age squared  -.001  -7.7  -.004  -5.3
Primary  .10  IA  .16  1.8
Appremntice  .17  2.4  .26  3.0
Secondary  .41  6.0  :46  5.2
Higher  .71  10.0  .81  9.0
Industry  .003  1.1  .05  1.8
Services  .07  2.3  .08  2A
Semi-private  .09  2.7  .10  2.9
Private  .04  1.7  .04  1.5
Constant  8375  70.2  8715  61.7
R2  .36  .30
F  69.8  61.5
Earnings in 1992  Earnings in 1993
Variable  T stat  T stat
Female  -.31  -14.7  -.25  -10.8
Age  .04  8.2  .04  7A
Age squared  -.00  -7.8  -.00  -6.5
F&bnary  .10  1.4  .15  1.6
Apprentice  18  235  .25  2.7
Secondary  .42  6.0  A5  4.8
Higher  .73  10.0  .80  8.5
Industry  .019  0.6  .09  2.9
Services  .07  2.3  .09  2.5
Semi-private  .11  3.2  .10  2.9
Private  .06  2.1  .02  0.8
Constant  8448  69.3  8666  57.7
R 
2 .31  .29
F:  68.9  56.7
Income in 1992  Income in 1993
Variable  T stat  . T stat
Female  -.33  -16.1  -.27  -10.9
Age  .03  5.4  .03  4.9
Age squared  -.00  -4.1  -.00  -3.6
Primary  .08  1.2  .15  1.4
Apprentice  .17  2.5  .26  2.5
Secondarv  .39  5.9  A6  45
Higher  .72  10.5  .82  7.9
Industry  -.03  -1.0  .05  .6b-
Services  .07  2A  .07  1.9
Semi-private  .10  3.0  .04  1.1
Private  .08  3.2  .02  0.6
Constant  8701  75.1  8916  56.4
R!  .35  .29
F  80.3  54.7
Source:  HH
26policy in 1993; but it seems that the use of national guidelines may have achieved the same
effect.  Nominal wages appear to settle close to the guidelines,  which in turn are conditioned  on
expected consumer price inflation.  We now turn our attention to the bargaining framework
itself.
Bargaining and the tripartite  system
A tripartite system has been retained  but now only has partial coverage, being reasonably
complete only for state fnns  and for many privatized firms.  Formal agreements at branch and
firm level exist and these mostly cover wage changes, either centered on the base wage or
avenage wages 14.  There also appears to be some explicit consideration of employment in a
limited number of cases.  The impression is that trade unions are increasingly  concerned only
with wages but in larger statelprivatized firms employment and wages are jointly bargained.
The unions perceive in addition that real wages  have fallen by significant magnitudes, while the
wage distrbution  has become more skewed (in part by use of fringe benefits).  While union
membership is quite large, accounting  for as much as 60% of the workforce, militancy to date
has been low although apparently rising 1".
Figure  19 provides some indicators of  the  extent to  which national wage targets,
embodied in a wage rule or in the guidelines, were respected. For 1992, nominal wage growth
exceeded target wage growth by over 3.5 percentage  points. With consumer  prices settling close
to target inlation,  the result was a real wage expansion of some 2.5 percentages  points above
target.  For 1993, there is almost complete  convergence  of target and actual real wage increases
- c2% - but both nominal wage and consumer prices rose 6.5-7 percentage points over
projected changes.  Nominal wage growth in the economy  as a whole was thus significantly in
excess of target increases in both years.  For 1994.ql nominal wage growth over 1993.ql was
23.6% while consumer prices had increased over the same period by 16.8%.  This divergence
may in part be expectations-driven  as wage bargains build in the expected inflationary  effects
"In  1993  there were  36 branch  and 394 firm  level  agreements  covering  in all around  850,000  workers.
Aside  from the National  Interest  Concliation  Council,  sectoral  tripartite  bodies  also exist. In addition,  the Labor
Code  specifies  that each  firm  with more  than  50 employees  must  have  its own  council.
iS Membership  is reasonably  concentrted;  the  successor  union  - MSZOSZ  -- accoants  for around  40%  of total
union membership  and the three  other  federations  account  for a furher 30%.
27Figure 19
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28of a possible  exchange  rate and interest  rate adjustments.  The wage-price  dynamics  that underlie
this process have yet to be properly explored  but earlier estimations  pinned down a clear
feedback  from wages to prices 16.  The current guidelines  system  may not only sanction  an
unnecessarily  tight association  of wage  and price changes  but may -- given the absence  of any
penalties  on excessive  wage deals  -- permit financially  troubled  firms to indulge  in predatory
wage  setting.
These  aggregates  likely  encompass  significant  variation  in wage  settlements  across  sectors
and bargaining loci.  For  1992, we can more directly observe industrial branch wage
agreements. These  were  largely  concerned  with establishing  a floor for annual  wage  increases.
In almost  all cases, this floor ranged  between  13-18%;  in those  cases  where  the agreement  was
conditioned  on a maximum  increase,  that corresponded  to the 28% norm set under the then-
operating  incomes  policy. For firm level  agreements,  the majority  specified  an increase  in basic
or average wages  over the range 17-21%.  These numbers  would  be consistent  with a wage
setting  constrained  by the incomes  policy,  though  the causality  is far from clear.
For 1993  industrial  gross  wages  increased  by around  27%, with net wages  increasing  in
step  with consumer  prices  (23  %). As yet, we  lack  information  that is sufficiently  disaggregated.
However,  for 1993.ql we can contrast  projected  wage  increases  with actual  settlements  for 700
industrial  firms. As a significant  part of the annual  wage  round  is concluded  in the first quarter
of the year, this  provides  a reasonably  complete  indication  of the  annual  wage  outcome  for 1993.
Table 13 shows  that actual  wage settlements  have a somewhat  bi-polar  structure. A third of
fms  have actual  settlements  from 0-10%  nominal  wage increases  for 1993.ql over 1992.ql.
Over  40% of firms  have  wages  increasing  by more  than 20%, with  nearly  a quarter  giving  wage
increments  in excess of 30%, with half of this sub-sample  being in excess of 40%.  The
employment  distributions  for this sample  do not suggest  that firm size is strongly positively
correlated with wages. But we lack direct information  on other attributes -- such as ownership -
- of 1bis population  of firms 
1;  Commander and Coricelli  (1992)
n Branch level data allow us to pick up the outliers; the most striking being mining where wages settled 8.5%
above national averages, while employment  continued to decline at a far higher rate dtn  the industry average; a
likely insider story.
29The partial evidence  set out above  suggests  that in the absence  of an explicit  incomes
policy  in 1993,  we observe  quite  sharp  variation  in wage  settlements,  whether  discriminating  in
terms of firm size, ownership  or other  attributes. The picture  is not one of generalized  wage
convergence  to amounced  inflation. Yet we also  know  that average  industrial  wage  increases
over 1993  were close  to consumer  prices. The distribution  given in Table 14 probably  hints at
the reason. While  a large  number  of firms  indeed  had small  nominal  wage  changes,  a significant
share also harvested  large increases,  considerably  in excess  of wage  guidelines  or amnounced
inflation.
Part of the reason  for this  polarity  in wage  settlements  may  be that guidelines  are set and
then  incorporated  in either  branch  or firm level  agreements,  in a good  part of the remaining  state
sector as well as part of the privatized  sector.  Further, these settlements  are made with
reference  to consumer  prices;  the wedge  ensures  that  the burden  is shifted  to firms, if and when
management's  bargaining  power is attenuated.
The wedge  effect  remains  powerful  because  of a combination  of factors. Reductions  in
consumer  subsidies,  food  price  shocks  attributable  to the drought,  changes  to VAT  brackets  and
rate in 1993  and the rise in the relative  price of services  - given that the share  of non-traded
goods  is higher  in the consumer  rather  than producer  price  index  and that consumption  of non-
traded  goods  is converging  to OECD  levels  - have  been  the  main  factors  explaining  the presence
and size of the wedge L8*
At first  approximation,  we can  think  of Hungarian  workers  and  unions  aiming  at a stable
consumption  wage. Real wage  resistance  will obviously  arise when  fens'  labor costs rise in
response  to exogenous  changes  which  have  an impact  on workers. Wage  bargains  conditioned
on consumer  prices  will obviously  sanction  the gap  between  the real labor  costs  of firms  and the
real consumption  wage  of workers. Further,  the size  of the wedge  will  be affected  not only  by
the consumer  to producer  price relationship,  but also by relative  tax rates on employers  and
workers.  Labor  taxes  paid  by employers  in Hungary  are higher  than  OECD  averages.  However,
changes  to relative  prices  rather than to relative  tax rates  have primarily  shifted  the wedge  in
recent  years. Real  wage  resistance  has  arisen  because  real  labor  costs  have  responded  positively
* Note tLat  the wedge is significant  for all industrial  branches, the ppi range being 6-13% in 1993.
30Table 13: Projected and actual wage increas  for 700 industrial rwms;  1993.1/1992.1
Change in wage  Projected  -- A--Actual
(range)  No. of firms  Employment  (%)  No. of finns Employment(%)
constant  37  2.7  116  11.0
0.1-10%  121  11.7  119  28.4
10-15%  121  25.7  76  17.6
15-20%  148  30.4  84  11.2
20-30%  191  21.5  140  16.9
>30%  82  8.5  165  14.9
o/w 30-35%  30  3.6  41  5.3
olw >40%  27  1.9  88  6.4
Source:  Ministry  of Labor
Table 14: Net Flows, 1990-1994
Based on Munkaeromerleg  Based on LFS
1990  1993 Net change  1993  1994 Net change
Employed,  above
working  age  488  300  -188  175  138  -37
Working  age
population  5957  6061  +104  6034  6014  -20
of which:
employed  4991  4188  -803  4046  3916  -130
unemployed  24  680  +656  498  476  -22
out of labor  942  1193  .+251  1490  1622  +132
force
Table 15: Pearson and partial correlation coefficients between regional umemployment and





1991.12.  .275  .433
(.06)
Increase  of the rate
1992.12.  - 1991.12.  -.099  -.360
(.13)
31to elements  of the wedge.
How do we interpret  the 1993  nominal  wage outcomes  and the apparent  absence  of
outside  factors  in governing  the wage  settlement  ?  De novo  private  firms  appear  to pay lower
wages than state and privatized  firms and to be more responsive  to outside  labor market
conditions.  Yet  average  wage  settlements  in the economy  appear  to converge  toward  consumer
price  inflation.  This reflects  the continuing  weight  of state  and privatized  firm wage  decisions.
Part of this can perhaps  be attributable  to initial  wage  jumps in privatized  firms  and hence  a
level  effect,  but it also  seems  likely  that state  sector  wages  have  been  quite  inflexible.
Given  what we know  about  the path of profits  and their distribution,  this may point  to
continuing  rent  appropriation  in state  and  privatized  firms. Assuming  that  state  sector  wages  are
set at or around  average  rather  than marginal  product,  low  exit rates  from unemployment  and
the clear  evidence  that  workers  are not indifferent  to keeping  their  jobs or unemployment,  also
suggest  that the actual wage is higher than the wage equivalent  of unemployment. One
implication  is  that workers  will  tend  to oppose  decisions  that  threaten  their  continuing  access  to
these  rents.
To the extent  that  state  and some  privatized  firms  have  internal  bargaining  power  set-ups
that  retain  high  workers'  relative  bargaining  power  and de facto  result  in workers  and  managers
playing  cooperatively  against  government,  we may be facing  a substantive  insider  problem.
Wage  claims  will be dissociated  from firms' ability  to pay and insiders  may be indifferent  to
outside  conditions.  To break  this requires  either  a change  in policy  by government  (a shift  to
a credible  and tough stance  on employment)  and/or further institutional  changes  (including
unbundling)  that can  break  insiders'  ability  to extract  rents. The importance  of doing  this will
be amplified,  of course,  if stateprivatized  insider  wage  claims  provide  a reference  point  for
other  wage  settlements  in the economy;  but the evidence  on this is patchy.
The overall  conclusion  at this stage  is that the guidelines  approach  sends  wages  in part
of the state and privatzed firm sector  toward  expected  inflation.  As a significant  part of the
annual  wage  round  is concluded  in the first  four months  of any year, the guideline  expectation
on inflation  would  tend  to be sanctioned  and built  into expectations.  If the objective  is to get
wages  as close as possible  to actual  inflation  and to ensure  that expectations  are not simply
satisfied,  there would  be a clear case for moving  to shorter  wage  adjustment  intervals.
32There also appears to  be no evident association  of  wages to  either economy-wide
productivity  or even firm level productivity  changes.  This can be traced to weak managerial
bargaining  power and, to some extent, the associated  attachment  of t1he  govenment to social
peace.  We then have the result that even if unions are not that powerful, managers  prefer 'the
easy life'.  The bill may ultimately  end up with the fisc and/or the banking system 19.
Unemployment
Unemployment  rose rapidly after 1989 from a negligible  base, driven by the sharply
asymmetric  dynamics  of state and private  sector  employment.  Both registered  unemployment  and
the ILO-based  rate began  to fall in 1993 after a peak  reached in February 1993. The registered
rate then was 13.6% and regional  rates varied between c7-22%  2.
First,  wve  can sum up net shifts between labor market states between 1.1.1990 and
1.1.1993. using the classification  of the CSO's "Munkaeromerleg',and  between 1.1. 1993 and
1.1. 1994., using the Labor Force Survey  21.  In constructing  Table 14 we calculate the stocks
for  1 January by takdng  the average of the preceding and following quarters, assume that
employment  abroad stayed on its 1993 level (45,000) and add it to the employment  stock. As
indicated above, the  decline in employment is large and continuing.  At the  same time,
movements  out of the labor force have indeed been large.
The recent fall of unemployment  cannot be attributed to a  rise OI employment. In
1992.Q4-1993.Q4.  unemployment  rose by 30,000  while employment  declined  by 232,000; since
then both unemployment  and employment  have been falling. The inflow to unemployment
decreased  slightly  relative to 1992. On the other side, after controlling  for seasonal effects,  we
find that the rate of registered  unemployed  finding a job remained  in the range of 3-4 per cent
per month since early 1992.  A net shift towards non-participation  can be attributed to  a
"Note that managers  in state  firms  may  have  autonomy  in decision-maldng  but  not nocesarily  large  relative
bargaining  power  with respect  to workers. In so far as managers  have  acquired  or maintained  their positions
through  political  connections  their  bargainig power  with  respect  to government  (and  henice  for subsidies)  may  be
large.
2DThe  range was larger - 7-46%  - when using labor office  areas  as the reference.
2a  The  latte is more  stringent  in classifying  people  out of work  as unemployed  so its figure  for 1.1.1993.  is
498,000  as opposed  to 680,000  in the 'Munkaeromerleg".
33combination  of factors, including  exhuLastion  of benefit eligibility,  or an increase in unrecorded
employment. Furthermore, many  workers  losing  jobs fail to enter or re-enter  the unemployment
register, due to lack of eligibility  for benefits,  or because  of access to eamings outside  the wage
labor sector.  Further, available  data on planned  separations  and hirings by firms in the LMFS
also forecast a further drop in the rate of job destruction  in 1994 (assuming  the decision  to close
some of the huge loss-makers is further delayed) rather than a rise of the re-employment
probability  for the unemployed.
Given this environment, the stagnant pool characterization  of unemployment  is thus
unlikely to change in the near future.  And there are several other particularities that are
important.  They include, (i) a low exit probability. The 3.0/4.0% monthly exit rate would
suggest an expected completed  duration  well in excess of two years in steady state.
(ii) Little or no feedback  to wages,  as indicated  earlier in Table 9.  A similar conclusion
is suggested  by the regional  data given  in Table 15. The partial correlation  coefficients  between
the rate of change  of industrial  wages  (taken  from CSO statistics  for the 20 counties)  on the one
hand, and the rate and change of unemployment,  on the other, are differently  signed. In other
words, regional  Phillips-curves,  if they exist at all in Hungary, suggest  a slightly slower wage
increase where unemployment is rising,  but no  observable negative feedback from high
unemployment  to lower wage claims. With the close-to-zero  parameters and low significance
levels the  correct conclusion might be  that,  in  contrast to  some other countries where
correlations  between  regional  unemployment  and wages  can be easily  shown on simple  scatters,
Hungary as yet does not experience  any such feedback  2.
(iii) Mismatch; the lack of feedback  to wages may, to a great extent, be attributed to
regional  and skill mismatch. Fazekas  (1993)  has shown that the highest  rates of unemployment
are  experienced in remote rural areas and highly industrialized, typically single-employer,
micro-regions,  where vacancies  are locally  minimal.  Fazekas and Kollo (1994)  in addition  find,
on  the basis of the LME survey, that demand for retraining increases when the fimn has
hard-to-fill  vacancies,  decreases  if the local labor force has a higher educational  level, but only
slightly decreases  when there is a higher local rate of :nemployment,  after controlling  for the
22 Blanchard  et al (1994)
34first and the second  effect. Finally, indirect  evidence  supporting  this hypothesis  is also provided
by  the  fmding that  there  are  close-to-zero firm  level labor  tumover  rates  (defined as
min(separation, hiring]lemployment). An average rate of 0.2 per cent, invariant to the local
unemployment rate,  suggests that  firms  do  not,  or  cannot,  exploit the  large  pool  of
unemployment  to replace  their poorly performing  workers.
(iv) Persistent regional differences; looking at local unemployment rates we find a
surprisingly  stable  rank order for smaller regions. Regressions  using variables  on infrastructure,
wealth, educational  level, degree of industrialization  and land quality from 1990 are more and
more successful in explaining regional variation as we move closer to  1994. The regional
differences seem to be rooted, to a great extent, in characteristics  inherited from the past and
hence difficult to change.
(v)  Rising  recurrent  unemployment; a  simplified  vision  of  transition-induced
unemployment, in which temporary joblessness is generated in  a process of relatively fast
transition from  collapsing (state) to  emerging (private) sectors  is  partly  challenged by
observations  on labor market flows. These indicate  that transitions  occur mainly in the form of
job-to-job flows;  unemployment  appears  persistent  (indicating  that the main streams  of transition
avoid the pool of unemployment)  and there is now evidence of an apparent rise in recurrent
unemployment. Figure 20 likely underestimates  the proportion of reentrants as many do not
register because of lack of benefit eligibility,  while others returning to unemployment  after a
short spell of employment  had actually  remained  throughout  on the register  and were not counted
as reentrants.  Repeat spells are partly accounted  for by temporary lay-offs  in agriculture but
preliminary  estimations  by labor office officials  and researchers  suggest  the growing importance
of intense mobility between unemployment  and the low wage, short tenure end of the private
sector.  If we consider that recurrence  shows  up on the inflow as well as on the outflow side of
unemployment,  the rate of mobility  between  fte steady  jobs of a 'primary segment' and the pool
of unemployment  seems even less intense  and decreasing.
The policy implications  of points (i)-(v) are more-or-less  clear but do not promise any
quick help for the unemployed.  They include  targeted ifrastructural and job creation programs
in regions with very high unemployment;  but all such  policies are likely  to have fairly extended
lags. More generally,  but subject  to the regional  and other constraints  that characterize  current
35Figure 20
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36Hungarian  unemployment,  a further  option would be to scrap the current system of lump sum
payments  for job creation and instead  provide, within the same fiscal envelope, marginal  wage
subsidies aimed at making the unemployed  more attractive  to employers and hence allowing
some share of the long run unemployed  a chance to get back into work.
Conclusion
First, we summarize what we understand  to be the current environment. There is a
spectrum  of firm types; (i) state firms; often  in bad shape and/or natural monopolies;  (ii) firms
privatized or innovated with significant  foreign direct investment (e.g, GE Tungsram; GM,
Ford, VW/Audi  etc). Foreign  direct  investment  is however  quite  heavily  concentrated,  by sector
and firm and thee employment  multiplier  may in fact be quite small (iii) firms privatized by
domestic, outside investors; (iv) firns  privatized  by insiders and (v) new small scale private
firms.
The first and latter are increasingly  outside  the tax system  (viz; state and de novo firms);
the first by de facto exemptions;  the latter by evasion (crude Ministry  of Finance estimates  of
untaxed income are in the range 300/600 HUE bn).  Thus, as the size of the de novo sector
rises, the effective  tax yield will tend  to fall for constant  evasion. The burden is shifted  further
to the taxable sectors -- privatized or new 'taxed' firms.  While subsidizing  the growth of the
private sector initially  may have been desirable,  dynamically  this is unlikely  to be tiue.  So the
obvious policy issue is to change the distribution  of the tax burden, while setting tax rates
consistent  with labor-enhancing  growth. The type  of growth  that has characterized  the last four
years is unlikely  to be sustained.
The distribution  of the tax burden  has obvious  implications  for the incentives  to generate
employment  in the taxed part of the economy. With evasion  high, average  payroll taxes have,
until  recently, risen quite  sharply.  Social insurance expenditures and other  labor taxes
comprised  around 34% of hourly compensation  costs in 1992; a significantly  higher share than
for OECD  economies  and  for most other  transition  economies.  And high contributions  rates have
been joined by apparent real wage rigidity in depressing  the rate of job creation in the taxed
sectors of the economy. As such,while  wage  levels are reasonably  low compared to neighbors
they remain  higher than in other transition  economies.  Further, despite  the large adverse  shocks
to output and employment,  consumption  wages have risen slightly and unit labor costs have
37clearly increased. Thus, while wages  have  not exploded  --  and the rigidities  indicated  above
may  partly  be laid at the door of the bargaining  system  -- the general  picture  points  to a lack  of
wage  flexibility. And it is worth  re-emphasizing  the apparent  absence  in our wage  estimation
of the regional  unemployment  rate. Outside  labor  market  conditions  in the wage  determination
seem, at best, weak. This probably  can  also  be explained  by the composition  of unemployment
leading  to duration  effects.  These  combinations  may result  in a continuing  inability  to generate
adequate  jobs with the associated  consequence  of high  and persistent  unemployment.
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39Appendix 1: Wage and Employment Setting in AVft  Firms
Finns controlled by the AVRt (Hungarian  State Holding Company) inciude a significant
share of loss-makers. In 1992 these amounted to 42% of the then 142.  firms in the portfolio and
included 5 out of the 41 largest loss-makers in the economy.  Half of the original 11  + 1 fimns
are still managed by AVRt and these include several of the larger holding companies whose total
employment at end-1993 still exceeded  40,000.
By early  1994 the  portfolio of  AVRt had  increased to  around  174 entities with  a
reasonably wide spread in terms of financial performance.  As Table 1A indicates, however,
the bulk of firms fall into categories requiring financial and other restructuring.  Categories 2
and 3 account for nearly half the firms and over two-thirds of total employment for the entire
AVRt portfolio.  Clearly, size and restructuring needs are correlated.  In what follows, we
concentrate on these two categories.
The first point to  note is that the size of losses in  1993 in Groups 2 and  3 remain
significant.  Pre-tax profits were negative to the tune of nearly 1000 mHUP with nearly 40%
of these category firms registering losses. A similar proportion had negative profittsales ratios
for 1993.  We are able to match up financial  data with changes to employment and wages for
a major sub-sample of these restructuring firms.  The data presented below relate to 50 out of
the total 85 firms in this category.  In addition, we compare these finms with other entities in
AVRt's portfolio, the bulk of which comprise firms from Category 1; easily privatizable firms.
Several features are revealing, as indicated in Table lB.  For the total sub-sample (I 13 or over
60% of the total portfolio) the average employment  decline in 1993 was around 10%.  Most of
this was concentrated  in firms requiing restructuring; average employment in Categories 2 and
3 fell by nearly 20 %.  For other firms in the sample, average employment hardly declined; by
1.2%.  Yet average nominal wages across all categories show remarkable convergence, rising
by between 28-30% in 1993 23.  Average wage increases are in fact slightly higher in firms
requiring restructurng.  And the  coefficient of  variation  over  1992  and  1993 for  both
employment and the wage bill shows no change.  In short, there is no evident conventional
association between measures of financial performance and the change in wages.  Indeed,
23  Note that the level of the average wage in Groups 2 & 3 was only slightly (5%) below the Ml sample average
and the differn=ce  in the level declined in 1993.
40average wages in AVRt fins  increased by around 7% in real terms (consumption wages) in
1993; well above national averages.
Figures 1A & 1B make this quite explicit.  There is a great deal of clustering in the
distribution of average wage increases.  This suggests the presence of some outside wage rule,
possibly tied to announced guidelines. Further, firms with larger employment  adjustments have
generally higher than  average nominal  wage increases. Firms requiring restructuring  thus appear
to force employment adjustments but these reductions also appear to sanction increased wage
claims for remaining insiders.  The extent to which this corresponds to  a classical insider
problem and/or end-game behavior is difficult to tell.  But it does clearly indicate the weak
governance exercised by the state holding company and the evidently weak association of firm
level financial performance with wages.
Table IA: AVRT portfolio;  1993
Group  Type  Employment  Nnibe
Group 1:  Firms easily privatized  18143  44
Group 2:  Firms needing financial restructuring  39942  52
Group 3:  Firms needing other restructuring  69664  33
Group 4:  Firms to be liquidated  96  6
Group 5:  Firms that will not be privatized  4643  12
Group 6:  Firms partially privatized in 1993  28971  5
Group 7:  Firms handed over to other agencies  39  11
Group 8:  Finiancial  institutions  9  11
TOTALS:  161318(+)  174
Table  iB:  Changes in Employment and Average Wages in 1993 (percent)
Change in Employment  Average Wage
Total Sample  -10.2  29.2
Groups 2 & 3  -19.6  30.1
Other Groups  -1.2  28.0
[Note: Tol  sample=  113:  Groups 2 &3  =  50: For  otal sample  coefficientof  variaionforcemploymenuin  1992and 1993 was 1.5B  and 1.63:
for wage bill 2.21 and 2.24 respectively.]
41Figure  1A
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